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from Digital and Cyberspace Policy Program
Governments, critical infrastructure, and economies rely on space-dependent services—for example, the Global Positioning
System (GPS)—that are vulnerable to hostile cyber operations. However, few space-faring states and companies have paid any
attention to the cybersecurity of satellites in outer space, creating a number of risks. 
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A Tesla Roadster automobile floats through space after it was carried there by SpaceX's Falcon Heavy. SpaceX handout/Reuters
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Introduction
The tasks of securing outer space and cyberspace are converging. The internet increasingly
depends on space-enabled communication and information services. Likewise, the operation of
satellites and other space assets relies on internet-based networks, which makes these assets, like
cars and medical equipment, devices on the internet of things. New government actors,
companies, goals, and technologies are expanding and transforming space activities. However,
neither space policy nor cybersecurity policy is prepared for the challenges created by the
meshing of space and cyberspace, which could increase national security risks.
To meet these challenges, government, industry, and international action is needed. The Donald
J. Trump administration’s National Space Council should develop cybersecurity
recommendations for space activities, and federal agencies should prioritize these within the
government and in cooperation with the private sector. In crafting needed legislation for
commercial space activities, Congress should bolster industry efforts to strengthen cybersecurity.
Private-sector actors should strengthen their adoption of cybersecurity best practices and
collaborate with one another on improving implementation of cybersecurity strategies.
Internationally, the United States should pursue collaboration on space cybersecurity through the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), plurilateral space cooperation mechanisms, and
bilateral forums.
Cybersecurity Comes to the Final Frontier
Outer space has been a national security priority for spacefaring nations since the 1950s.
Governments started space programs for intelligence, military, political, and scientific purposes
and developed countermeasures against space-based threats from rivals, such as anti-satellite
capabilities. Countries managed security competition by banning weapons of mass destruction in
space and cooperating on peaceful uses of space. Government programs catalyzed private-sector
adaptation of dual-use technologies to provide satellite communication services.
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Despite the importance of satellites, the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded [PDF] in
2002 that efforts on critical infrastructure protection did not include the satellite industry, but
should do so. Similarly, cybersecurity has not been a priority in government and private-sector
space endeavors. One leading analysis [PDF] asserted that cybersecurity discussions often
overlook space activities’ vulnerability to cyberattack. For example, neither the UN
governmental group of experts (GGE) on outer space nor the UN GGE on cyberspace addressed
the convergence of their respective agendas.
Governments, critical infrastructure, and
economies rely on space-dependent services
—for example, the Global Positioning System
(GPS)—that are vulnerable to hostile cyber
operations. Geopolitical competition fuels the
militarization of space, which heightens state
incentives to devise cyber espionage,
interference, and attack strategies against
rivals’ space operations. The United States
suspects that China has engaged in cyber
operations against U.S. satellites. Chinese
military writings emphasize [PDF] the need to target satellites to “blind and deafen the enemy.”
The then commander of Air Force Space Command, General John E. Hyten, told Congress in
2016 that “adversaries are developing . . . cyber tools to deny, degrade, and destroy” [PDF] U.S.
space capabilities that support war fighting, critical infrastructure, and economic activity. Other
countries likely believe the United States is preparing to conduct cyber espionage, disruption,
and attack operations against the space assets of rival states.
The commercialization of space heightens cybersecurity concerns for many reasons, including
market incentives to lower costs and innovate quickly, often at the expense of software and
hardware security. Entrepreneurial activities—dubbed the New Space sector—are underway in
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space transport, space tourism, asteroid mining, lunar operations, and missions to Mars. A small-
satellite (“smallsat”) revolution involving spacecraft far smaller than traditional satellites is
unfolding. Networks of linked smallsats can provide internet access, communications, data
storage and transmission, imaging, and remote sensing. This next generation of satellites
harnesses innovations in computing, electronics, miniaturization, imaging, sensors, big data, and
artificial intelligence. Satellite services for Earth observations from space are growing. They
support many policy and commercial purposes and contribute to agricultural productivity,
transportation efficiency, and environmental monitoring. Commercial space activities use
cutting-edge technologies and produce valuable data and are, thus, targets for cyber espionage,
including economic cyber espionage, and cybercrime.
Challenges
Space agencies, the satellite industry, cybersecurity researchers, nongovernmental bodies, and
intergovernmental satellite organizations show increasing awareness of the space cybersecurity
challenge. Nevertheless, experts are worried. NASA’s then chief information security officer,
Jeanette Hanna-Ruiz, warned that “it’s a matter of time before someone hacks into something in
space.” Chatham House’s David Livingstone asserted that “people are just shuffling . . . paper
around” and suggested that only “a disaster” might catalyze serious action. Josh Hartman, a
former senior Pentagon official and Air Force officer, argued before the satellite industry’s first
cybersecurity summit held in 2017 that, on cybersecurity, “most of the space community . . . has
their heads in the sand.” The “attack surface” of space activities is expanding, but governments
and industry are not taking adequate action.
Protecting space activities requires understanding the particular cyber vulnerabilities that arise in
various space operations. For example, satellite cybersecurity encompasses the satellite itself,
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transmissions to and from Earth, and ground stations. U.S. military and intelligence satellite
systems are vulnerable to kinetic and cyberattacks. Civilian smallsat systems might also prove
insecure, given the lack of cybersecurity in their design, their use of commercial off-the-shelf
components, and the vulnerabilities potentially created by connecting satellites to operate as
complex, orbiting networks.
Neither international law nor diplomacy has
grappled effectively with space cybersecurity.
Multiple bodies of international law are
relevant, but controversies about whether and
how international law applies to cyberspace
have adversely affected cyber diplomacy.
Such travails have elevated the prominence of
nongovernmental efforts to clarify
international law’s application in cyberspace,
such as the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber
Operations. However, states continue to conduct cyber operations that violate international law.
For example, the UN International Telecommunication Union prohibits interference with satellite
transmissions, yet such interference frequently occurs.
The militarization of space potentially threatens the requirement in the Outer Space Treaty (OST)
that space activities comply with international law to maintain international peace and security
and promote international cooperation. The United States has declared that space is now a “war-
fighting domain,” and China’s and Russia’s military ambitions in space are growing. The UN
Committee on Disarmament’s work on a treaty to prevent an arms race in space failed. As
happened with cyberspace, these difficulties in space diplomacy have increased
nongovernmental interest in clarifying how international law applies to military operations in
space.
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The commercialization of space fuels concerns that the private sector will unduly influence how
states interpret the OST’s duty to authorize and supervise nongovernmental space activities. The
debate over whether U.S. support for commercial space activities violates this OST requirement
might also create diplomatic problems.
New diplomatic initiatives on space cybersecurity would encounter headwinds. Putting “space”
before “cybersecurity” does not alleviate the geopolitical tensions that already limit cooperation
on cyberspace and space. The United States, China, and Russia have not agreed on how to
approach cybersecurity or address military activities in space. Recent diplomatic activities on
space and cybersecurity concluded without addressing space cybersecurity, including the UN
GGEs on cyberspace and outer space and the European Union’s code of conduct for space
activities [PDF]. Negotiations in the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space on
guidelines for the long-term sustainability of space activities considered but did not adopt
proposed guidelines [PDF] on information-security policies for the terrestrial and orbital parts of
space systems. Controversies and disagreements during these efforts suggest that reopening them
for space cybersecurity would not be effective. Further, the increased number of spacefaring
nations, which now includes such countries as South Korea and the United Arab Emirates,
complicates diplomacy by requiring more countries to reach consensus.
States might also believe more diplomatic activity is not necessary because they already have
sufficient incentives to refrain from dangerous cyber operations in space. Disabling a satellite
through cyber means could turn it into space debris—already a major problem—that threatens
space activities for all countries. The importance of intelligence satellites in maintaining nuclear
deterrence also encourages restraint in interfering with the satellites of rival nuclear powers.
Following trends on Earth, countries might want to avoid diplomatic activity in order to engage
in cyber operations in space that “subvert the integrity of political, social, and economic systems,
rather than destroy physical infrastructure” by, for example, manipulating or hijacking an
adversary’s space infrastructure to spread propaganda and misinformation.
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Recommendations
The United States can provide leadership on cybersecurity in outer space through a
comprehensive strategy. The Trump administration is positioned to advance space cybersecurity
because its priorities include improving critical infrastructure cybersecurity, addressing security
threats to space operations [PDF], and promoting commercial space activities. The
administration resurrected the National Space Council and should task it with developing
recommendations on strengthening the cybersecurity of space infrastructure. To do so, the
council should convene government officials and leaders from the commercial space sector to
share insights on managing cybersecurity as space and cyberspace merge. These leaders should
include people who have led both information technology and space enterprises, such as Paul
Allen (Stratolaunch Systems), Jeff Bezos (Blue Origin), and Elon Musk (SpaceX). The Trump
administration should instruct the Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Communications Commission, and NASA to make
cybersecurity a priority in their space collaborations with the private sector.
With private-sector space activities
expanding, Congress should adopt a
comprehensive regulatory framework for the
commercial space sector. Current law does
not regulate the full range of space activities
the private sector is planning, a problem
recognized [PDF] but not addressed during
the Barack Obama administration. A
comprehensive framework would provide
commercial space enterprises with regulatory
certainty and help the United States comply
with its OST obligation to authorize and
Government
Congress should
adopt a
comprehensive
regulatory
framework for
the commercial
space sector.
“
”
  
 
Facebook Twitter
LinkedIn Email
Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities | Council on Foreign Relations
https://www.cfr.org/report/cybersecurity-and-new-era-space-activities[4/4/2018 11:15:52 AM]
supervise nongovernmental space activities. The legislation should emphasize the importance of
existing federal law on cybersecurity information sharing, provide government assistance to
industry-led efforts to strengthen space cybersecurity (especially concerning threats from state
actors), and—as happened in other sectors, such as energy—facilitate public-private
collaborations on cybersecurity.
Improving space cybersecurity requires extending good cybersecurity practices into the
commercial space sector and addressing problems specific to space activities. Advice for this
sector repeats familiar mantras, such as the need for intra-sector collaboration, information
sharing, enterprise risk management, encryption, insider threat prevention, and supply chain
protection. The federal government has, for example, rightly stressed [PDF] the utility of the
Cybersecurity Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [PDF] for satellite
companies.
Industry associations in space sectors should move from identifying general principles and
recommendations, such as those in the Joint Statement on the Satellite Industry’s Commitment to
Cybersecurity, to supporting implementation activities. The Satellite Industry Association could,
for example, include in its annual State of the Satellite Industry Report [PDF] information on the
industry’s cybersecurity activities, as is done in other industries.
The difficulty of reaching multilateral agreement on cybersecurity and space issues means the
United States should address space cybersecurity in plurilateral and bilateral contexts. The
United States should raise space cybersecurity within NATO, given the alliance’s plans to
upgrade its satellite and cyber defense capabilities. U.S. bilateral cybersecurity cooperation with
spacefaring countries, such as India and Japan, should include space cybersecurity. With their
history of collaboration, NASA and the European Space Agency, which is increasingly aware of
Industry
International
Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities | Council on Foreign Relations
https://www.cfr.org/report/cybersecurity-and-new-era-space-activities[4/4/2018 11:15:52 AM]
cybersecurity threats to its programs, should sign a memorandum of understanding to cooperate
on space cybersecurity.
More ambitiously, the United States should use effective mechanisms of space diplomacy to
improve space cybersecurity. For example, the International Space Station (ISS) has involved the
United States, Canada, Japan, Russia, and the European Space Agency managing the “the most
politically complex space exploration program ever undertaken.” The United States should
discuss the need for more cooperation on space cybersecurity within the ISS framework. In
addition, the United States could lead establishment of an intergovernmental coordination
mechanism for developing guidance on space cybersecurity. The mechanism could be modeled
on the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), composed of space agencies
from leading spacefaring countries. The IADC’s nonbinding guidelines are credited with
reducing space debris produced by new launches.
Conclusion
Actions at the national, industry, and international levels can harness growing awareness about
space cybersecurity and strengthen policy and industry practices as the convergence of space and
cyberspace accelerates. Outer space might not be the “final frontier for cybersecurity,” but
achieving cybersecurity beyond Earth is one of the many responsibilities the new era of space
activities creates for governments and societies.
This Cyber Brief is part of the Digital and Cyberspace Policy program. The Council on Foreign
Relations takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S.
government. All views expressed in its publications and on its website are the sole
responsibility of the author or authors.
Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities | Council on Foreign Relations
https://www.cfr.org/report/cybersecurity-and-new-era-space-activities[4/4/2018 11:15:52 AM]
Explore More on Space
by Adam Segal
April 2, 2018
New Cyber Brief:
Cybersecurity and
the New Era of
Space Activities
with Joanne I. Gabrynowicz
, Lori Garver and Bob
Richards
November 30, 2017
Who Owns
Space?
Commercial
Activity Beyond…
by Guest Blogger for
Stewart M. Patrick
October 10, 2017
The Outer Space
Treaty’s Midlife
Funk
Explore More on CFR
Cybersecurity and
the New Era of
Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities | Council on Foreign Relations
https://www.cfr.org/report/cybersecurity-and-new-era-space-activities[4/4/2018 11:15:52 AM]
Logo About CFR
For Media
Daily News B
Sign up for a m        
the world.
Newsletter
Email Address
by David P. Fidler
April 2, 2018
Space Activities
by Elliott Abrams
April 2, 2018
Time to Tighten
the Screws on
Cuba?
by Claire Felter
March 29, 2018
The End of
Antibiotics?
Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities | Council on Foreign Relations
https://www.cfr.org/report/cybersecurity-and-new-era-space-activities[4/4/2018 11:15:52 AM]
©2017 Council on Foreign Relations. All rights reserved.
Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.
